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Mode of Liability for the Crimes of Subordinates or
Separate Offence of the Superior?
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Abstract
The nature of command responsibility is still open to debate in international crim-
inal law: is a superior to be held criminally responsible for the crimes committed
by his subordinates ‘as an accomplice’, for having participated in the commission of
the crime by omission, or as a perpetrator of a separate offence of dereliction of duty?
This article surveys the post-WW2 case law and the first international instruments
on this point, and then analyses the jurisprudence of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The judges appear to have recently
adopted a new approach to Article 7(3) ICTYSt. in that the superior is held respon-
sible ‘for failure to prevent or punish with regard to the crimes of the subordinate’and
no longer ‘for the crimes of his subordinates’. It is a responsibility ‘sui generis’ indeed,
where the crime of the subordinate plays a central role in the attribution of respon-
sibility to the superior. It is, therefore, necessary to carefully consider the relation-
ship between the superior’s failure to act and the subordinate’s crime, both with
regard to objective and subjective elements. The same question finally arises in
relation toArticle 28 of the Rome Statute, the literal interpretation of which implies
that a superior shall be punished for the same crime committed by his subordinates.
In order to avoid the risk of holding a person guilty of an offence committed by others
in violation of the principle of personal and culpable criminal responsibility, it is
crucial to consider separately the different cases of command responsibility, which
are based on distinct objective and subjective requirements.
1. The Terms of the Problem
Command responsibility1 has been recognized as a principle of customary
international law for a long time.2 However, the (legal) nature of command
* Post-doctoral researcher, University of Milan. [chantalmeloni@gmail.com]
1 Although the expression superior responsibility should be preferred since it comprises the mili-
tary commander and the civilian superior, the traditional military expression command respon-
sibility, which is still largely in use, will also be used in this article without intending any
substantial difference of meaning between the two expressions.
2 See K. Ambos, ‘Superior Responsibility’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, J.R.W.D. Jones (eds), The Rome
Statute of International Criminal Law, Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 825^848;
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responsibility is still open to debate in international criminal law: is it a mode
of liability for the crimes committed by subordinates or rather a separate
offence of the superior for failure to discharge his duties of control pursuant
to international law? In other words, is a superior to be held criminally respon-
sible for the crimes committed by his subordinates ‘as an accomplice’,3 or for
a separate offence of omission, consisting of the dereliction of his duty to
control, prevent or punish?4
No doubt, this particular legal question arises within the context of superior
responsibility for omission or, more properly, for dereliction of duty. It is clear,
in fact, that if the superior contributes with any positive act to the commission
of the crime (typically by ordering or instigating the subordinate to commit the
crime), he becomes a participant in the crime, and his criminal liability follows
from the general principles of accomplice liability. In other words, the question
is whether the superior who knew, or had reason to know, that his subordi-
nates were committing or had committed crimes, and failed to take proper
measures to prevent the commission of such crimes or to punish them, shall
be charged and possibly convicted merely for his omission, or for his subordi-
nates’crime that he failed to prevent or punish.
As it was recently stated by the judges of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the formerYugoslavia (ICTY):
a cet e¤ gard, se pose la question de savoir si un commandant qui a manque¤ a' son obligation de faire
respecter le droit international humanitaire par ses troupes est tenu pe¤ nalement responsable de sa
propre omission ou pluto“ t des crimes qui s’ensuivent.5
Determining the nature of command responsibility is relevant not only from
a theoretical, but also from a practical point of view. On one hand, there is an
impact on sentencing in international proceedings. Limiting a superior’s
responsibility to his failure to prevent or punish may have a substantial
impact on sentencing to the extent that the superior would be convicted not
for the principal crime (e.g. crimes against humanity, war crimes and geno-
cide), but for a separate offence of omission. This can be observed in the recent
conviction of Naser Oric¤ , a former commander of the Srebrenica armed forces,
as regards ICTY case law, see Judgment, Delalic¤ and others (IT-96-21-T), Trial Chamber,
16 November 1998, xx333, 343 (hereinafter Delalic¤ and others Judgment).
3 ‘As an accomplice’ is used here not necessarily to describe the formal status of the superior
pursuant to criminal law categories, but rather from the perspective of the consequences that
attach to his liability. In international criminal law (following the Anglo-American system,
as well as in many civil law countries) the accomplice is charged and convicted for the (same)
crime committed by the perpetrators, i.e. for the principal crime, see E. van Sliedregt,
The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law
(The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2003), 61 ff.
4 For an important contribution on the subject, see O. Triffterer, ‘‘‘Command Responsibility’’ ^
crimen sui generis or participation as ‘‘otherwise provided’’ in Article 28 of the Rome Statute?’,
in J. Arnold (ed.), Menschengerechtes Strafrecht, Festschrift fu« r Albin Eser (Mu« nchen: Beck, 2005),
901^924.
5 Judgment, Hadz› ihasanovic¤ (IT-01-47-T), Trial Chamber, 25 March 2006 (hereinafter
Hadz› ihasanovic¤ Judgment), x68 ff.











who was sentenced by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY to two years of imprison-
ment (instead of the18 years requested by the Prosecutor) for failure to prevent
the crimes committed by his soldiers.6 In the Prosecutor’s opinion, the ‘two
years sentence is manifestly inadequate because it is based on a fundamental
error in the nature of Oric¤ ’s criminal responsibility by classifying Oric¤ ’s crimes
as a failure to discharge his duty as a superior, rather than as a mode of
liability for the actual crimes, . . .’.7
On the other hand, the effort to accommodate the superior’s responsibility
for failure to act within the complex net of contributions ç typical of the
commission of international crimes ç is also useful at a national level in
terms of the implementation of the Rome Statute in domestic legislation.
Difficulties arise if superior responsibility is understood as a mode of liability
pursuant to which the superior shall be sentenced for the intentional crimes of
his subordinates. This is particularly evident with respect to two aspects of
superior responsibility: when the superior negligently failed to know, and
thus to prevent or punish, the commission of crimes by his subordinates, and
when liability is solely based on the failure to punish.8 Some domestic laws
have structured at least one aspect of command responsibility ç the failure to
control or the failure to punish ç as a crimen sui generis.9
2. From the Origins of the Principle to the First
Codifications
A. The Post-WW2 Period: Command Responsibility as a
Form of Participation
Going back to the remote origins of the principle, it can be observed that,
pursuant to the command responsibility theory, the commander was generally
held responsible for the same crime committed by his subordinates.10
Surveying several precedents, the judges of the ICTY found that national
legislation on war crimes enacted after World War II considered command
responsibility as a form of accomplice liability.11 The French ordonnance of
6 See infra part 3B.
7 See The Prosecution’s Appeal Brief, Oric¤ (IT-03-68-A), 16 October 2006, x 10 (hereinafter
The Prosecution’s Appeal Brief ).
8 See the extensive analysis of M. Damas› ka, ‘The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility’,
49 American Journal of Comparative Law (2001) 455^496.
9 See Triffterer, supra note 4, at 903, with reference to the GermanVo« lkerstrafgesetzbuch of 2002,
which adopted a different solution, defining the failure to control as a separate offence of the
superior (x 13), as well as the failure to report the crime to the competent authorities (x 14).
Cf. infra note 108.
10 For an interesting historical survey of command responsibility for war crimes, see W.H. Parks,
‘Command Responsibility for War Crimes’, 62 Military Law Review (1973) 1^104.













1944, for instance, declared responsible as an ‘accomplice’ the superior who
‘tolerated’ the criminal acts of his subordinates;12 a verb which implied that, to
be held responsible, the superior actually knew about the crimes and con-
sciously decided not to take action to prevent or repress them.
In this regard, it should be noted that most of the rules referring to the
responsibility of superiors adopted during this period can be considered
only lato sensu forms of command responsibility,13 in that they generally
implied a kind of positive participation of the superior in the subordinates’
crime: the superior was therefore correctly held responsible for the crime as
an accomplice, having contributed directly to the commission of the
crime.14 During the Nuremberg trials and the subsequent proceedings
most of the convictions of high-ranking German commanders and of
other subjects holding positions of authority in German industry were
actually based on positive acts of the superiors.15 Some important convic-
tions, however, were based also on their failure to act.16 In these latter
cases the judges referred to concepts such as ‘acquiescence’ according to
which to be held criminally responsible for the criminal acts of his sub-
ordinates, the superior must be found ‘both to have had knowledge and to
have been connected to such criminal acts, either by way of participation
or criminal acquiescence’.17
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the case of Japanese
General Yamashita, who was sentenced to death because, through his omis-
sion, permitted his troops to commit atrocities.18 Although no adequate finding
was made by the American military commission about the actual knowledge of
12 Art. 4 of the French Ordinance of 28 August 1944, in The UN War Crimes Commission,
Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 1947-48, Vol. IV (Buffalo: Hein, 1997) (hereinafter Law
Reports), 87.
13 The responsibility of the superior who ordered or instigated the commission of the crimes by
subordinates is often indicated as command responsibility lato sensu, to distinguish it from the
responsibility of the superior who failed to prevent or repress the criminal conduct of subordi-
nates (command responsibility stricto sensu).
14 This is, in our view, valid also with regard to Regulation 10 of the Canadian Act respecting war
crimes of 1946 (in Law Reports,Vol. IV, 128^129) and Regulation 8(ii) of the British RoyalWarrant
of 1945 (in Law Reports, Vol. I, 108^199) quoted by the Halilovic¤ judgment as examples of
command responsibility. A provision about command responsibility stricto sensu was, instead,
in the British Manual of Military Law (1958), see Parks, supra note 10, at 17^20.
15 In this regard see, B.V.A. Ro« ling, A. Cassese (ed.), The Tokyo Trial and Beyond: Reflections of a
Peacemonger (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), 74 ff.
16 Highly significant proceedings on this issue include the Hostage trial and the High Command
trial: see infra note 17.
17 Nuremberg Trial of the United States v.Wilhelm von Leeb (the High Command trial), in Trials of
War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. XI
(Buffalo: Hein, 1997), 543^512 (hereinafter TWC). See also U.S. v.Wilhelm von List (the Hostage
trial), in TWC,Vols X and XI, 1271.
18 The charge against General Yamashita was to have ‘unlawfully disregarded and failed to
discharge his duty as a commander to control the operation of the members of his command,
permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes’, in Law Reports,Vol. IV, 3 ff.
For a survey of the process see R. Lael, The Yamashita Precedent: War Crimes and Command
Responsibility (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1982).











the General with respect to the crimes committed by his soldiers,19 it was
believed that ‘the crimes were so extensive and widespread, both as to time
and area, that they must either have been wilfully permitted by the accused, or
secretly ordered by the accused’.20 In other words, the underlying reasoning of
the judges was that Yamashita participated (not physically, but through secret
orders or acquiescence) in the commission of the atrocities.21
In sum, although post-WW2 case law ‘was not uniform in its determination
as to the nature of the responsibility arising from the concept of command
responsibility’,22 at that time command responsibility was largely interpreted
as a mode of liability by which the superior was responsible for the crimes of
the subordinates. This form of responsibility sometimes appeared as a form of
participation in the subordinates’ crime, and sometimes shifted towards forms
of vicarious/imputed liability.23 In either case, the superior was charged and
convicted for the principal crime (i.e. the underlying offence committed by his
subordinates). Command responsibility, however, was not necessarily under-
stood as it is today in terms of being based on a pre-existing legal duty to
prevent or punish: in most of the cases the superior was found guilty for
having positively contributed to the commission of crimes by his subordinates
and therefore sentenced for such crimes.24
B. The First ‘Codifications’: Article 86(2) of Additional Protocol I and Article
7(3) of the ICTY Statute
The first international instrument to expressly ‘codify’ this form of responsibil-
ity is the Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions. In this
respect, the wording of Article 86(2) of the Additional Protocol, that ‘the fact
19 The case of General Yamashita has been strongly criticized as an example of a conviction on
the basis of strict liability: see M.C. Bassiouni, ‘Ratione personae and elements of criminal
responsibility’, in Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal Law (2nd edn., The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 1999). For a different interpretation, see Parks, supra note 10, 22 ff.
20 Quoted in L.C. Green, ‘Command Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law’,
5 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems (1995) 319^371, at 336.
21 In this sense, Parks, supra note 10, 22 ff, however, concedes that the value of theYamashita trial
lies in the recognition of the existence of an affirmative duty of the superior to take the
appropriate measures in his power to control his subordinates, and that the failure to discharge
such duty constitutes a violation of the law of war. See also the judgment of the US Supreme
Court, in ReYamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1945).
22 Halilovic¤ Judgment, supra note 11, x 48.
23 SeeYamashita, supra note 19. See also the Tokyo judgment of the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East where the indictment separately charged those who ‘ordered, authorized and
permitted’ to commit the violations of the laws of war (count 54) and those who ‘deliberately
and recklessly disregarded their legal duty to take adequate steps to secure the observance and
prevent breaches’ of the laws of war (count 55). Nearly the entire Japanese cabinet was found
responsible for war crimes against prisoners under the latter count. As stated by Judge Ro« ling
in his dissenting opinion, ‘It seems that the judgment goes too far where it assumes the
responsibility of every member of the government for the atrocities committed . . . .’ See
Cassese, supra note 15.












that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a sub-
ordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibil-
ity, as the case may be, if . . .’, could allow both an interpretation of command
responsibility as a mode of liability for the crimes of subordinates, as well as
a separate offence of dereliction of duty of the superior. Moreover, not only does
this provision remain in principle open to both these readings, but it also does
not define the character of the responsibility, whether penal or disciplinary,
primary or vicarious, to be imposed on the superior for failure to act. Such
a determination is left to the domestic law.25
A similar open approach, although limited to a responsibility criminal in
character, can be found in the formulation of Article 7(3) of ICTY Statute26
and in the related UN Secretary-General’s Report stating that ‘a commander
should be held responsible for failure to prevent a crime or to deter the unlaw-
ful behaviour of his subordinates’.
However, the UN Commission of Experts, in its Final Report on the ICTY
Statute,27 affirmed that superiors are ‘individually responsible for awar crime or
a crime against humanity committed by a subordinate’, which entails that
they considered the superior responsible for the same crime committed by the
subordinate. The International Law Commission in its Commentary to the Draft
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Securityof Mankind of1996 also stated that
a ‘military commander may be held criminally responsible for the unlawful
conduct of his subordinates if he contributes directly or indirectly to their com-
mission of a crime’ and that he ‘contributes indirectly to the commission of a
crime byhis subordinate by failing to prevent or repress the unlawful conduct’.28
3. The Case Law of ICTY
A. General
A similar approach was reflected in the early case law of the ad hoc
Tribunals,29 starting with the landmark judgment in Delalic¤ and others.30 That
command responsibility is a type of individual criminal responsibility for the
illegal acts of subordinates31 is a common affirmation in ICTY judgments.
25 See Damas› ka, supra note 8, at 486.
26 ‘The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was committed
by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if . . ..’ An equivalent
formulation is contained in Art. 6(3) ICTRSt.
27 Final Report of the Commission of Experts, UN Doc. S/1994/674, 27 May 1994.
28 Draft is available online at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%
20articles/7_3_1954.pdf (visited 8 May 2007).
29 For sake of clarity it should be noted that, although in the following analysis, reference has
been made specifically to the jurisprudence of the ICTY, the ICTR has also extensively dealt
with this subject and has issued important judgments on superior responsibility. See,
for instance, the judgments against Kambanda, Musema, Barayagwiza and Kajelijeli.
30 Cf. supra note 2.
31 Delalic¤ and others Judgment, supra note 2, xx 331^333.











As was summarized in a recent judgment:
Whether command responsibility is a mode of liability for the crimes of subordinates or
responsibility of a commander for dereliction of duty has not been considered at length in
the jurisprudence of the Tribunal. However, the consistent jurisprudence of the
Tribunal has found that a commander is responsible for the crimes of his subordinates
under article 7(3).32
The exact meaning of the expression ‘responsible for the crimes’ has not been
discussed in the case law until very recently.33 In any event, the fact that both
in indictments and in sentencing, pursuant to Article 7(3), the superior is
usually charged and found guilty (or found not guilty) of the same crime
committed by his subordinates, makes it clear that command responsibility
has been traditionally considered by the ad hoc Tribunals as a mode of liability
pursuant to which the superior is made responsible for the same crime com-
mitted by his subordinates.34 Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, some recent
judgments of the ICTY seem to challenge this assumption.
B. From Superior’s Responsibility ‘for the Crimes of his Subordinates’ to
Superior’s Responsibility for Failure to Act ‘With Regard to the Crimes of
the Subordinates’
Recently a Trial Chamber of the ICTY affirmed that superior responsibility
pursuant to Article 7(3) shares ‘a common feature’with other modes of liability,
and in particular with the instigation and aiding and abetting, in that ‘both are
accessory to principal crimes committed by other perpetrators’.35 The differ-
ence, however, is that ‘whereas for a finding of instigation and aiding and
abetting there ought to be a certain contribution to the commission of the
principal crime, superior criminal responsibility is characterised by the mere
omission of preventing or punishing crimes committed by (subordinate)
others’.36
Notwithstanding previous findings whereby superior responsibility was seen
as a kind of accessorial liability and ‘therefore . . . the superior [was] described
as responsible ‘‘for the acts of his subordinates’’’, the judgment clarifies that
‘this does not mean, however, that the superior shares the same responsibility
as the subordinate who commits the crime in terms of Article 7(1) of the
Statute, but that the superior bears responsibility for his own omission in fail-
ing to act’, and concludes that the superior is responsible ‘merely for his neglect
of duty with regard to crimes committed by subordinates’.37 This expression,
32 Halilovic¤ Judgment, supra note 11, 53.
33 Hadz› ihasanovic¤ Judgment, supra note 5, x69.
34 See The Prosecution’s Appeal Brief, supra note 7, xx159 ff; ibid., x152.
35 Judgment, Oric¤ (IT-03-68-T), Trial Chamber, 30 June 2006, xx 292^293 (hereinafter Oric¤
Judgment).













if read together with other details of the same judgment, marks a difference in
the judges’ interpretation of superior responsibility.
The superior is responsible not ‘for the crime committed by subordinates’ but
‘merely’ for ‘his neglect of duty’ with regard to the crimes committed. To this
extent, the neglect of duty seems to be considered as a separate crime of
omission. This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that in the final para-
graphs of the judgment, which refer to the determination of the sentence, the
failure to prevent or punish is indicated as the only crime for which the super-
ior is to be sentenced.38 Moreover, the Trial Chamber did not find the accused
guilty for the crimes of murder and cruel treatment he failed to prevent. On the
contrary, as further clarified by the Prosecution in its recent appeal brief,
‘the Trial Chamber erroneously convicted Oric¤ of a separate dereliction of duty
crime (‘‘failure to discharge his duty as a superior’’), rather than murder and
cruel treatment’.39 In this sense, the criminal liability of the superior under
Article 7(3) was limited to the neglect of his duty to act, with regard to the
crimes committed by others. This judgment appears to consider superior
responsibility not as a mode of liability for the crimes of subordinates, but as
an autonomous basis for the superior’s responsibility for a separate ‘dereliction
of duty offence’.40
This ‘new approach’ adopted by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in the Oric¤
judgment is not a complete anomaly in the case law of the Tribunal; to some
extent it can be traced back to the Halilovic¤ judgment of 2005,41 and to the
Hadz› ihasanovic¤ judgment, which soon followed.42 In the effort to clearly differ-
entiate superior responsibility from the modes of liability provided for
in Article 7(1), the Halilovic¤ judgment stresses the different nature of
Article 7(3), underscoring the fact that it is a responsibility for an omission,
pursuant to which the superior is responsible for his failure to act in order to
prevent or repress the crimes committed by his subordinates as required by
international law:
Thus ‘for the acts of his subordinates’ as generally referred to in the jurisprudence of the
Tribunal does not mean that the commander shares the same responsibility as the subordi-
nates who committed the crimes, but rather that because of the crimes committed by his
subordinates, the commander should bear responsibility for his failure to act.43
Along the same lines the Hadz› ihasanovic¤ judgment affirms that the accused
shall not be convicted for the crimes committed by his subordinates, but only
for the failure to fulfil his duty to prevent the crimes or punish the perpetra-
tors.44 To this extent, in the judges’ view, superior responsibility must be
38 Ibid., x727.
39 The Prosecution’s Appeal Brief, supra note 7, x152.
40 Ibid., x158.
41 Halilovic¤ Judgment, supra note 11, x54.
42 Ibid., x54. See also Hadz› ihasanovic¤ Judgment, supra note 5, xx74^75.
43 Halilovic¤ Judgment, supra note 11, x54 (emphasis added).
44 Hadz› ihasanovic¤ Judgment, supra note 5, x 2075.











considered as a mode of personal liability for omission (‘un mode de responsabil-
ite¤ personnelle pour omission’).45
Similar reasoning had already been expressed in 2003 by some judges of the
Appeals Chamber in the context of the decision on interlocutory appeal on
command responsibility in the Hadz› ihasanovic¤ case.46 In his dissenting opinion
Judge Shahabuddeen, although admitting that arguments can be found in
support of a reading of Article 7(3) of the Statute as having the effect of
making a commander ‘guilty for an offence committed by others even though
he neither possessed the applicable mens rea nor had any involvement whatso-
ever in the actus reus’, stated that he preferred ‘to interpret the provision as
making the commander guilty for failing in his supervisory capacity to take
the necessary corrective action after he knows or has reason to know that his
subordinate was about to commit the act or had done so’. In his opinion,
a reasonable reading of the provision cannot make ‘the commander a party to
the particular crime committed by his subordinate’.47 Judge Hunt, in arguing
that command responsibility can attach also to situations where the crimes that
the superior failed to punish were committed before the assumption of control
by the superior over the perpetrators, affirmed that ‘the criminal responsibility
of the superior is not a direct responsibility for the acts of the subordinate.
It is a responsibility for his own acts (or, rather, omissions) in failing to prevent
or to punish the subordinate when he knew or had reason to know that he was
about to commit acts amounting to awar crime or had done so’.48
There is certainly nothing revolutionary in finding the nature of superior
responsibility as consisting of the superior’s failure to act under a
duty to do so.49 However, a new element has arisen from recent
45 It may be noted, however, that the uncertainty about the nature of this form of liability results
in somewhat contradictory statements on the consequences of a conviction under Art. 7(3)
ICTYSt. It is affirmed that the concept of superior responsibility is an exception to the general
principles of criminal law, to the extent that it allows a superior to be held responsible for a
crime even if he did not take any part in the commission of the crime and even if he did not
have the intention to commit the crime, thus contradicting the assumption that the superior
should be liable of a separate crime of omission. This judgment represents the first conviction
on the sole basis of Art. 7(3) ICTYSt. Hadz› ihasanovic¤ Judgment, supra note 5, xx 2075^2076.
46 Decision on interlocutory appeal challenging jurisdiction in relation to command responsibil-
ity, Hadz› ihasanovic¤ (IT-01-47-AR72), Appeals Chamber, 16 July 2003 (hereinafter Command
ResponsibilityAppeal).
47 Partial dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, Command Responsibility Appeal,
Hadz› ihasanovic¤ , ibid., x32.
48 Separate and partially dissenting opinion of Judge Hunt, Command Responsibility Appeal,
Hadz› ihasanovic¤ , ibid., x13.
49 The ‘failure to act under a duty to do so’ has been always recognized by the jurisprudence of the
Tribunals as the essence of command responsibility; it is a duty that arises from the superior’s
possession of effective control over the subordinates; see Judgment, Tadic¤ (IT-94-1-A), Appeals
Chamber,15 July 1999 (hereinafterTadic¤ Appeal Judgment), x98 ff. It should be recalled that not
only those holding de jure positions of authority, but also those exercising de facto powers of
control can be charged. For a critical approach, see T. Weigend, ‘Bemerkungen zur













ICTY jurisprudence: the fact that in the Oric¤ judgment the superior is (or,
at least, appears to be) convicted for a separate crime of ‘failure to
discharge his duty as a superior’, rather than for the crimes of his sub-
ordinates.50 It will be for the Appeals Chamber ultimately to decide
whether such an interpretation is correct and consistent with the interna-
tional law applied by the Tribunals. In the meantime, some remarks can be
made on this issue.
C. The Relationship Between the Failure toAct of the Superior and the Crimes
of Subordinates: A ‘Sui Generis’ Responsibility for Dereliction of Duty
In order to establish criminal responsibility pursuant to the principle of com-
mand responsibility, the superior’s mere failure to act is not sufficient. It has
been consistently found that the first (although often implicit) requirement of
command responsibility is the actual commission of a crime by a subordi-
nate.51 The superior’s general failure to control his troops does not entail
criminal responsibility per se in international law.52 The superior’s criminal
responsibility flows from the neglect of a specific duty to take the measures
that are necessary and reasonable in the given circumstances, in order to
prevent those specific crimes or to punish the perpetrators thereof. This
implies, on one hand, that the superior who has done everything materially
possible to prevent or punish the commission of crimes by his subordinates,
should not be held responsible if, notwithstanding his appropriate exercise
of control, crimes have been committed; but, on the other hand, it also
means that no criminal responsibility can attach pursuant to Article 7(3) of
the Statute to the superior who has failed to discharge his duty to control
subjects under his command/authority and control as long as no international
crime has been committed.53
This raises the question of what relationship subsists between the omission
of the superior and the crimes of his subordinates in the jurisprudence of the
ICTY from two perspectives: first, there is the objective element (causality);
second, there is the subjective element (mens rea). In other words: does
the omission of the superior need to be causally linked to the subordinates’
crime? And secondly: does the mens rea of the superior need to be established
with reference to (all) the elements of the crime committed by the
subordinates?
50 See The Prosecution’s Appeal Brief, supra note 7, x152.
51 At least in the attempted form, see Oric¤ Judgment, supra note 35, x330.
52 The fact that under international law the failure to exercise control properly is not punished
does not exclude that it may have disciplinary or even criminal consequences under national
law, see Triffterer, supra note 4, at 911.
53 Ibid., 911 ff.











1. The Objective Relationship between the Superior’s Omission and the
Subordinates’ Crime: The Problem of Causality
Regarding the objective element, it is not entirely clear whether (and, if so,
which kind of)54 a causal relationship is required between the omission of the
superior and the crimes of the subordinates.55
With regard to the failure to prevent, both interpretations of the causal
element are theoretically possible. Depending on the one adopted, the principle
of command responsibility will assume a different character. In the one case,
it will be consistent with the liability of the superior for his mere failure to act
(where the crime of subordinates is not linked to the failure of the superior);
in the other case, it will be consistent with the liability of the superior for his
contribution, and therefore participation, in the crime of subordinates (which
would represent the result of the criminal offence).
The jurisprudence of the Tribunal has generally found that there is no need
to prove the element of causation in relation to command responsibility.56 This
accords with the recognition of command responsibility as a form of autono-
mous liability of the superior, generated by his failure to act and limited to his
omission. In this sense, it has been recently affirmed that if it had to be proven
that the superior’s failure to act causally contributed to the commission of the
subordinates’ crime, there would be no difference between Article 7(3) and
Article 7(1), and superior responsibility would be rendered superfluous.57
However, the negation of the element of causation appears to be less consis-
tent with an understanding of command responsibility as a mode of liability
pursuant to which the superior is sentenced for the crimes of subordinates.
As affirmed in Delalic¤ and others, ‘a recognition of a necessary causal nexus may
be considered to be inherent in the requirement of crimes committed by sub-
ordinates and the superior’s failure to take the measures within his power
to prevent them’.58 Therefore, ‘in this situation the superior may be considered to
be causally linked to the offences, in that, but for his failure to fulfil his duty to
act, the acts of his subordinates would not have been committed’.59 Such an
interpretation of causality in command responsibility, however, is unsatisfac-
tory to the extent that the judgment flatly concludes there is no requirement of
proof of causation as a separate element of superior responsibility under inter-
national law.60
54 On the problematic causal relationship between the failure to act and the crime committed, see
K. Ambos, Der allgemeineTeil desVo« lkerstrafrecht, Ansa« tze einer Dogmatisierung (Berlin: Dunker &
Humblot, 2002), 683 ff.
55 See the important contribution of O. Triffterer, ‘Causality, A Separate Element of the Doctrine of
Superior Responsibility as Expressed in Article 28 Rome Statute?’, 15 Leiden Journal of
International Law (2002) 179^205 and, partially critical,Weigend, supra note 49, 999 ff.
56 See Judgment, Blas› kic¤ (IT-95-14-A), Appeals Chamber, 29 July 2004, x73 ff.
57 See Oric¤ Judgment, supra note 35, x338.
58 See Delalic¤ and others Judgment, supra note 2, xx389 ff.
59 Ibid., x 399 (emphasis added).
60 Ibid., x 398. This affirms the existence of a causal nexus to be proven by the Prosecutor,












With regard to the failure to punish, the situation is different and compli-
cated by the fact that it is highly problematic to require a causal link
between a crime committed by a subordinate and the subsequent failure of
the superior to punish the perpetrator.61 The jurisprudence of the ad hoc
Tribunals simply provides that it ‘would make no sense to require’ a causal
link with regard to the failure to punish.62 It can be noted that such a
finding ç consistent with an understanding of command responsibility as
an autonomous basis of liability for the superior limited to his failure to act,
and more precisely to punish (as a separate offence) ç appears to be again
unsatisfactory from the opposite point of view (as a mode of liability pur-
suant to which the superior is made responsible for the crimes of
subordinates).63
2. The Subjective Relationship Between the Omission of the Superior and the
Subordinate’s Crime
A link between the superior’s failure to act and the subordinate’s crime can
exist also on the subjective level, with reference to the mental element of the
superior. The jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals has expressly rejected
command responsibility as a form of vicarious or objective liability: it is ‘undis-
puted that command responsibility does not impose strict liability on a superior
for the offences of subordinates’.64 However, many aspects related to the
mens rea of superior responsibility are still open to debate in the case law of
the Tribunals. The relevant question to this discussion is particularly whether
the mens rea of the superior needs to be established by reference to all the
elements of the crime committed by the subordinates.65 The main problems
arise with respect to the ‘has reason to know’ standard.66 It is discussed
whether, to trigger superior responsibility, the information received by the
accused (superior) needs to point to a specific crime, or whether it suffices
that the superior received information of a general nature that would put him
this failure to control, such crimes ^ at least most probably ^ would not have occurred’,
Triffterer, supra note 4, at 919 and more extensively, supra note 55.
61 The reasoning is of course different if the failure to punish is considered in relation to
the commission of future crimes, seeTriffterer, supra note 55, at 201^202. From this perspective
the superior’s failure to punish can be causally related in the sense that it does not deter the
commission of future and imminent crimes by the same perpetrators.
62 See Oric¤ Judgment, supra note 35, x338.
63 For a difficult reconciliation between the failure to punish and the element of causation in
command responsibility, see again the position of Triffterer, supra note 55.
64 Judgment, Delalic¤ and others (IT-96-21-A), Appeals Chamber, 20 February 2001 (hereinafter
Delalic¤ and others Appeal Judgment), x313 (emphasis added).
65 See Triffterer, supra note 4, 909.
66 Pursuant to Art. 7(3) of the Statute, in fact, the superior can be held responsible not only if he
knew, but also if he had reason to know that his subordinates were about to commit crimes or
had already committed them. On the interpretation of this controversial standard, see Delalic¤
and others Appeal Judgment, supra note 64, x 233 ff.











on notice of the risk of crimes being committed.67 The Appeals Chamber has
found that it is sufficient that a superior ‘had some general information in his
possession’ to prove that he had reason to know, and that ‘this information does
not need to provide specific information about unlawful acts committed’.68 As
it was clarified in a later judgment, however:
It may not be inferred from this case-law that, where one offence (the ‘first offence’) has
a material element in common with another (the ‘second offence’) but the second offence
contains an additional element not present in the first, it suffices that the superior has
alarming information regarding the first offence in order to be held responsible for the
second on the basis of Article 7(3) of the Statute (such as for example, in the case of offences
of cruel treatment and torture where torture subsumes the lesser offence of cruel
treatment).69
To be held responsible the superior does not even need to know the identity
of the perpetrator (subordinate) of the crime he failed to prevent; it suffices to
‘prove[] that the individuals who are responsible for the commission of the
crimes were within a unit or a group under the control of the superior’.70
The fact that, as emerges from the case law of the Tribunal, the mens rea
of the superior does not need to be established with reference to (all) the
objective and subjective elements of the subordinates’crime appears more con-
sistent with a responsibility for failure to act rather than with a form of parti-
cipation in the crime of subordinates.71
3. A‘Sui Generis’ Responsibility
What actually emerges by the case law of the ad hoc Tribunals is that the
superior’s responsibility is a ‘sui generis’ responsibility ç as it has been in fact
repeatedly labelled72 ç which departures from the known categories of crim-
inal liability recognized by most legal systems.
Although apparently clear in its literal meaning73 and in its elements74 the
ambiguity of such responsibility is intrinsic in the particular link existing
67 See Judgment, Krnojelac (IT-97-25-A), Appeals Chamber,17 September 2003, x149 ff (hereinafter
Krnojelac Appeal Judgment).
68 Delalic¤ and others Appeal Judgment, supra note 64, x 238.
69 Krnojelac Appeal Judgment, supra note 67, x155.
70 Oric¤ Judgment, supra note 35, x315.
71 See again Triffterer, supra note 4, 909.
72 Cf. Halilovic¤ Judgment, supra note 11, x 78; Hadz› ihasanovic¤ Judgment, supra note 5, x 75;
Oric¤ Judgment, supra note 35, x 293.
73 ‘The literal meaning of Article 7(3) is not difficult to ascertain. A commander may be held
criminally liable in respect to the acts of his subordinates in violation of Articles 2 to 5 of the
Statute . . . . The commander would be tried for failure to act in respect of the offences of his
subordinates in the perpetration of which he did not directly participate’: Delalic¤ and others
Appeal Judgment, supra note 64, x 225 (emphasis added).
74 As consistently found from the Delalic¤ and others judgment, three elements need to be proven
for superior responsibility to be found: (i) the superior-subordinate relationship; (ii) the mental












between the superior’s criminal liability for dereliction of his duty to act and
the crime (not prevented or punished) committed by his subordinate.
This form of liability is actually unknown in domestic criminal law and
represents a hybrid of several concepts. On one hand, it is not consistent with
any form of complicity, since there is no need to prove the causal link with the
underlying crime committed by the subordinate and since the mens rea thresh-
old is lower than the one required for complicity.75 On the other hand, it is
hardly conceivable as a separate offence of failure to act since the liability of
the superior is strictly and necessarily dependent from the commission of the
crime by the subordinate. This is well reflected with respect to the sentencing
process: notwithstanding the affirmation that the failure to prevent or punish
‘in itself is the only crime for which he/she is to be sentenced’, it is affirmed that
the determination of sentence shall be considered in proportion to the gravity
of the crimes committed by the subordinates.76 The gravity of the offence of the
superior, which is indicated as the most important criterion to determine the
measure of the sentence to be imposed,77 actually depends on various factors
among which the gravity of the subordinates’ crime is the first of the principal
factors.78 Therefore, even assuming that under Article 7(3) an individual is not
convicted for the crimes committed by his subordinates,79 the fact that the
gravity of the subordinates’ crime is one of the most important sentencing
factors shows the crucial role played by the crime of subordinates in assessing
the (gravity of the) responsibility of the superior.
In conclusion, superior responsibility, as interpreted by the jurisprudence of
the ad hoc Tribunals, is a sui generis mode of liability for failure to act that finds
no direct equivalent in domestic criminal law. This conclusion does not mean,
however, that command responsibility can avoid respecting the fundamental
principles of criminal law, especially the principle of individual and culpable
criminal liability.80 Depending on the subjective and objective elements
or punish. A fourth element can be added: the commission of the crime by persons other than
the superior, see Oric¤ Judgment, supra note 35, x 294 and related notes.
75 In order to assess accomplice liability for an intentional offence, the minimum criteria required
are the accomplice’s awareness of making a contribution that facilitated the commission of the
crime and the substantial and direct effect of the contribution on the commission of the crime.
See Judgment, Furundz› ija (IT-95-17/1-T), Trial Chamber, 10 December 1998, xx 229 ff.; see also
Art. 2 of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind of 1996 and its
Commentary by the International Law Commission, supra note 28. For a broader analysis, see
E. Amati, ‘Concorso di persone nel diritto penale internazionale’, in Digesto Discipline
Penalistiche, Appendice di approfondimento (Torino, 2004), 128 ff.
76 Oric¤ Judgment, supra note 35, x727 (emphasis added).
77 Ibid., x726 with related notes.
78 Ibid., xx728^729. The Trial Chamber found that in determining the gravity of the subordinates’
crimes in relation to the responsibility of the superior the following factors shall be considered:
the legal nature of the offences, their scale and brutality, their impact upon the victims and
their families and the extent of the long term physical, psychological and emotional suffering of
the survivors.
79 Ibid., x724.
80 See Damas› ka, supra note 8.











actually present in a particular case, both readings (as a responsibility for mere
failure to act or as a responsibility for the subordinates’ crimes) become theo-
retically possible.81
4. Article 28 of the Rome Statute: Conclusions in the
Light of the Principle of Culpability
Superior responsibility can never be intended as a normal form of complicity.
This follows from the necessary superior^subordinate relationship and from
the particular requirements linked to the status of superior.82 For the same
reasons, however, considering the peculiar nexus between the superior’s fail-
ure to act and the crime of the subordinate, superior responsibility can neither
be intended as introducing a new and separate crime of the superior in inter-
national law, besides war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and
aggression (once it is defined). It is a mode of criminal liability for international
offences that presents different aspects depending on the facts in each case.
The question raised in the title is merely a problem of attribution of criminal
acts, both in an objective (causation) and in a subjective (culpability) sense:
no one, in fact, can be punished for a wrongful act unless the act is attributable
to him.83
The judges of the International Criminal Court (ICC) will face similar prob-
lems. According to the wording of Article 28 of the Rome Statute, a superior
‘shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court’
committed by his subordinates ‘as a result’ of his ‘failure to exercise control
properly’. From a literal interpretation of this provision it follows that the
superior is responsible (and, therefore, should be punished) for the principal
crime committed by his subordinates.84 However, it is necessary to avoid the
risk of holding someone guilty for an offence committed by others in violation
of the principle of individual and culpable criminal responsibility.85
81 Doctrinally, as it has been correctly affirmed, the concept of command responsibility falls
between liability for omission and complicity, G. Werle, Vo« lkerstrafrecht (Tu« bingen: Mohr
Siebeck, 2003), 179.
82 The Garentenstellung imposed on the superior by international law reveals the rationale beyond
such responsibility, aimed at strengthening the preventive and deterrent effect of international
law provisions; see, in this sense, the affirmative duties established byArt. 87 additional proto-
col I of 1977 and its commentary by J. De Preux,‘Article 87’, in C. Pilloud et al. (eds), Commentary
on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva:
ICRC, 1987), 1017^1023.
83 G.P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 454.
84 SeeWeigend, supra note 49,1003-1004, referring to superior responsibility under Art. 28 as ‘eine
erweiterte Form der Haftung fu« r fremdes Unrecht’.
85 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 136 ff. For the
adoption of this principle by the Rome Statute, see N. Pisani, ‘L’elemento psicologico del crimine
internazionale nella parte generale della Corte penale internazionale’, Rivista Italiana di Diritto












It is possible to distinguish various cases of superior responsibility86 on
the basis of their different objective and subjective requirements as provided
for in Article 28.87 Under the Rome Statute the superior is responsible for
having failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his
power to prevent or punish88 the criminal acts of the subordinates if he
knew, should have known (with regard to military commanders), or con-
sciously disregarded information which clearly indicated that the subordi-
nates were committing or were about to commit such crimes (with regard
to civilian superiors). Article 28, thus, introduces an exception to the general
rule on mens rea adopted by the Statute.89 Unlike the superior who knew,90
the commander who should have known does not possess the actual knowl-
edge about the risk, and therefore cannot intentionally fail to prevent or
punish the commission of crimes by his subordinates.91 In this case, the
omission can be negligent, to the extent that the superior was negligent in
failing, under a duty to do so, to consider the information that should have
alerted him to the (risk of ) commission of criminal acts by the subordi-
nates.92 Similarly, the omission of the superior who consciously
disregarded the information,93 is interpreted as introducing a form of gross
86 See G. Carlizzi, ‘L’ hypothe' se spe¤ ciale de responsabilite¤ du supe¤ rieur hie¤ rarchique dans le Statut
du Tribunal Pe¤ nal Internationale pour l’ex-Yougoslavie’, in E. Fronza and S. Manacorda (eds), La
justice pe¤ nale internationale dans les de¤ cision des tribunaux ad hoc (Milano: Giuffre' , 2003), 150.
87 It is ‘logically appropriate and relevant for practical purposes of sentencing to draw a distinc-
tion between different classes’ of command responsibility: see Cassese, supra note 85, at 206.
88 Where ‘punish’ in Art. 28 is intended to encompass the two expressions ‘repress’and ‘submit the
matter to the competent authorities’.
89 Art. 28, holding responsible the superior that ‘should have known’of the crimes, is a departure to
the general mens rea rule provided for by Art. 30 ICCSt., pursuant to which to be criminally
‘responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court’, it is
required that ‘the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge’: see A. Eser,
‘Mental Elements ^ Mistake of Fact and Mistake of Law’, in Cassese, Gaeta, and Jones (eds), supra
note 2, 889 ff.
90 Such knowledge can be proven directly or through circumstantial evidence, but can never be
presumed, cf. Delalic¤ and others Judgment, supra note 2, xx 384^386; Judgment, Aleksovski
(IT-95-14/1-T),Trial Chamber, 25 June 1999, x80.
91 As a general rule of criminal law, intent does not require only the willingness to commit or to
omit something, but also knowledge (i.e. awareness) of the factual circumstances underlying
the situation. On the two-fold notion of knowledge, and particularly on its role as a part of
intent, see Cassese, supra note 85, at 162 ff. See also, Fletcher, supra note 83, at 449.
92 This standard, although still debated, would introduce a form of negligent ignorance based on
the violation of the duty to control subordinates imposed on the superior by international law:
see K. Ambos, supra note 2, 864 ff. Arguments along these lines are found, inter alia, in the
US Model Penal Code, Art. 2.02(2)(d). For a brief survey on this matter, see M. Neuner, ‘Superior
responsibility and the ICC Statute’, in G. Carlizzi, G. Della Morte, S. Laurenti and A. Marchesi
(eds), La Corte Penale Internazionale (Napoli: Vivarium, 2003) 267^278.
93 This form of culpability, is similar to the standard the jurisprudence of the ICTY has referred to
as wilful blindness, that is, when a superior ‘ignores information within his actual possession
compelling the conclusion that criminal offences are being committed, or are about to be
committed’. Cf. Delalic¤ and others Judgment, supra note 2, x387.











negligence (also called conscious negligence in civil law), or a form of
recklessness.94
With regard to the failure to prevent, a superior may be held accountable for
the crime of his subordinates pursuant to the basic criminal law principles on
accomplice liability by omission95 and on commission by omission96 to the
extent that both the subjective and objective requirements are fulfilled, that is,
when he intentionally fails to take the measures in order to prevent the crime
knowing that his subordinates are committing it and being aware that the
crime will occur in the ordinary course of events.97 In this case, the superior
may also be considered as an accomplice in the crimes of his subordinates in
that, with his intentional failure to act under a duty to do so, he substantially
contributes to the commission of the crimes by the subjects under his
control.98 In the case of the superior who negligently fails to prevent a crime, it
is also theoretically possible to hold him responsible for the crimes committed
by his subordinates ‘as a consequence’ of his negligent failure to prevent them,
but this is more problematic. It is debated in criminal law whether is possible to
negligently participate in an intentional offence; notwithstanding some argu-
ments in favour, most of the authors tend to exclude this possibility.99 However,
some domestic systems recognize the possibility of holding someone criminally
94 For the concept of recklessness, unknown in civil law (it falls between conscious negligence
and dolus eventualis), see Fletcher, supra note 83. See also the US Model Penal Code,
Art. 2.02(2)(c). To consciously disregard, on one hand, implies that simple ignorance is not
enough but, on the other hand, does not require that the superior desired or intended the
crimes be committed; see Neuner, supra note 92, at 274^276.
95 On participation by omission in international criminal law, see the study of K. Welz,
Die Unterlassungshaftung imVo« lkerstrafrecht (Freiburg, 2004), in particular, 241ff.
96 Pursuant to this principle, someone can be held criminally responsible for a result if, under
a legal duty to do so, he fails to act in order to prevent the result, and a causal link exists
between his failure to act and the result. Therefore, assuming that international law imposes
on the superior a Garantenstellung consisting of the duty to control and to prevent the crimes of
subordinates, such crimes can be attributed to the superior if he intentionally fails to fulfil his
duty and they occur as a consequence of his failure. The principle of ‘commission by omission’
is not recognized by every national system: it is not recognized in France, but is recognized in
Italy and Germany. For the USA system, but with a broader view, see Fletcher, supra note 83,
at 581 ff.
97 See on Art. 30(2) ICCSt., Eser, supra note 89.
98 See A.M. Maugeri, ‘La responsabilite¤ des commandants dans le Statut de la Cour pe¤ nale inter-
nationale et la de¤ fense d’ordres supe¤ rieurs’, in M. Chiavario (ed.), La justice pe¤ nale internationale
entre passe¤ et avenir (Milan: Giuffre, 2003), 263 ff.
99 The early jurisprudence of the ICTY recognized ‘a requirement of intent, which involves aware-
ness of the act of participation coupled with a conscious decision to participate by planning,
instigating, ordering, committing, or otherwise aiding and abetting the commission of a crime’,
Judgment,Tadic¤ (IT-94-1-T),Trial Chamber, 7 May 1997, x674. The later jurisprudence generally
adopted a lowered threshold of participation, emphasizing the cognitive element (‘knowledge
that the act will assist’) over the volitional element. See Ambos, supra note 54, at 263^326;
362^370; 638 ff. Under the Rome Statute, the mens rea threshold of complicity has been sig-
nificantly raised: Art. 25(3)(c) now explicitly requires that the accomplice acts ‘for the purpose
of facilitating’ the commission of the crime. Cf. A. Di Martino, ‘La disciplina del concorso di
persone’, in A. Cassese, M. Chiavario, G. De Francesco (eds), Problemi attuali della giustizia penale












responsible for an intentional offence committed by others on the sole basis of
his negligent behaviour.100 As an argument in favour, it may also be contended
that the omission of the superior is causally linked with the crime, in that ‘by
breaching his supervisory duty’ the superior ‘has in some way contributed to
bringing about the offence’.101 Nevertheless it should be noted that, pursuant to
the principles of culpability and proportion of sanctions, it would be necessary
to introduce a gradation in the degree of criminal liability of the superior at
least at the sentencing stage,102 as the superior did not intend to ‘contribute’
in the crime.103
Finally, with regard to the failure to punish, where no real causal link subsists
between the subsequent failure to act of the superior and the crime previously
committed, the conviction of the superior for the same crime committed by the
subordinates is difficult to justify.104 An interesting view has been proposed on
this matter, which maintains that Article 28 would contain a double causal
connection: the first (and real) one occurring between the superior’s first omis-
sion, the failure to control the subordinates, and their crimes; the second one
occurring between the failure to take the measures to prevent or punish and
the crimes. Taking the appropriate measures, the superior would have a
‘second chance’ to stop the moving chain of causality he started by his failure
to control. If he fails to do so a ‘strengthening effect’ occurs, representing
the second causal connection between the superior’s omission and the
subordinates’crime.105
In conclusion, it can be observed that, as far as the failure to prevent is
concerned, depending on whether or not the superior actually knew about
the subordinates’ crime, superior responsibility would be more consistent with
a form of complicity in the former case, and more consistent with a responsi-
bility for mere violation of the specific duty to act in the latter case.106
100 Art. 57 of the Italian Criminal Code, for instance, provides for a form of criminal liability of
the director of a newspaper who negligently fails to exercise his duty to supervise for the
wilful crimes committed by others though the newspaper. See F. Albeggiani, I reati di
agevolazione colposa (Milan: Giuffre, 1984).
101 Cassese, supra note 85, at 207.
102 Similarly, Maugeri, supra note 98, at 268 ff.
103 The case at hand could also be considered as a form of accomplice liability, designed under
the ‘natural and probable consequence’doctrine, where the superior bears responsibility for
all the foreseeable consequences of his conduct. This implies, however, that the superior has
intent, or at least knowledge, with regard to his conduct, see T.Wu and Y.S. Kang, ‘Criminal
Liability for the Actions of Subordinates ^ the Doctrine of Command Responsibility and its
Analogues in United States Law’, 38 Harvard International Law Journal (1997) 272^297.
104 Liability for failure to punish could be theoretically based on the common law doctrine of
the ‘accessory after the fact’, which is however obsolete and has been rejected as such:
see the Defence’s Motion to strike portions of indictment alleging ‘failure to punish’ liability,
C erkez (IT-95-14/2-PT), 11 December 1997. In any case, Art. 25 ICCSt. does not admit forms
of complicity after the fact. See van Sliedregt, supra note 3, at 111 ff.
105 SeeTriffterer, supra note 55, at 179 ff. For a partially critical view, seeWeigend, supra note 49,
at 999ff.
106 T. Weigend, ‘Zur Frage eines internationalen allgemeinen Teils’, in B. Schu« nemann (ed.),
Festschrift fu« r Claus Roxin (Berlin, NewYork: Verlag de Gruyter, 2001), 1397.











Indeed, when a superior intentionally fails to prevent the commission of crimes
by his subordinates, the nature of command responsibility may become very
close to a form of complicity107 and the superior may be convicted for the
consequences of his failure to act, namely, for the subordinates’ crime. More
difficulties arise in holding the superior responsible for the principal crime
committed by his subordinates that he negligently failed to prevent. Although
theoretically possible, the full respect for the principle of culpability recom-
mends a cautious approach to convicting a superior for the crimes of his
subordinates that he negligently failed to prevent, in order to avoid the risk of
convictions based on strict liability. This would be the case if the following two
conditions were not properly proven: (i) that the superior actually had the
material possibility to exercise his control properly; (ii) that, if the superior
had properly exercised his control, he would have known of the risk.
With regard to the cases of failure to punish, where the wrongfulness of
the superior’s omission is concentrated in the violation of the specific legal
duty to act typical of the subject endowed with powers of command and con-
trol, the conduct of the superior cannot fulfil any participation in the (ante-
cedent) crime of the subordinate. The nature of superior responsibility in these
cases should thus be more conveniently found in the mere failure to act under
a duty to do so. Consequently, the superior should not bear responsibility for
the subordinates’ crimes ‘as if he had committed them’ on the sole basis of his
failure to punish them.
As emerges from this brief analysis, great care must be taken that the
different features of the forms of superior responsibility are taken into account
ç particularly at a national level when implementing the principle of superior
responsibility into domestic law ç in order to avoid potential violations of the
fundamental principle of individual and culpable criminal liability.108
107 Command responsibility should always be distinguished from the other forms of complicity
provided for in Art. 25(3) ICCSt. Pursuant to Art. 28, superior responsibility is ‘in addition to
other grounds of criminal responsibility’ under the Rome Statute. ‘In the case where both
the provisions, Articles 25 and 28, are applicable the active participation should always
prevail’: Triffterer, supra note 55, at 188.
108 The GermanVo« lkerstrafgesetzbuch (VStGB) of 2002, for instance, adopted a good solution on
this point, in that it implemented the principle of superior responsibility in three different
provisions having different requirements and consequences, see Weigend, supra note 49,
at 1026^1027. On the VStGB, see G. Werle and F. Jessberger, ‘Das Vo« lkerstrafgesetzbuch’,
Juristen Zeitung (2002), 729 ff. The majority of domestic legislations, (including Italy) are
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